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Epilogue: Environmental responsibility
Martin Reynolds, Chris Blackmore and Mark J. Smith
Imagine a world where all waste is sorted and recycled so that there is no need for
landfill sites, where all energy is produced from renewable sources and generates
minimal or zero pollution, where biodiversity is increasing rather than decreasing,
where all holidays enhance the ecological systems they affect. All this sounds a little
idealistic and perhaps utopian, even fanciful; but this is the kind of world that
environmentally responsible behaviour would create. If only it was that easy. In
practice there are different environmental issues that demand different responses,
there are other needs that conflict with the objectives of environmentalists, there are
other motives that are arguably just as legitimate that do not promote environmental
responsibility.
The readings making up this collection are selected from a vast and growing body of
literature addressing issues of environmental responsibility in our changing world. We
have brought together some quite different perspectives concerning ethics, policy and
action associated with caring for our environment and bearing accountability for harm
and wrongdoing. Our endeavour has necessarily been partial, but our purpose in
providing this text is to signpost a path towards an improved constructive engagement
with environmental issues from a standpoint of environmental responsibility.
Throughout this collection we have sought to provide a narrative that might be used as
a learning framework for thinking responsibly and creatively about the challenges of
sustainable development in the twenty-first century.
In its most simplistic formulation, our framework is structured around three questions
of environmental responsibility: first, the issues of what matters, as expressed in Part
2 of this reader; second, the agency of responsibility or who matters and in what
sense, as discussed in Part 3; and lastly, the justification for responsibility or why
some issues matter more than others and why some stakeholder roles matter more than
others, as reflected in the readings in Part 4. Raising these questions can help begin to
counter often-expressed concerns about (i) complexity associated with many issues at
stake; (ii) a need for engagement, through recognising agency and building personal
and collective stakeholding associated with such issues; and (iii) constructing the
overall rationale and political space for actively and fairly addressing them – the
justification for environmental responsibility.
For guidance on how these questions of ‘what’, ‘who’ and ‘why’ might be addressed
and, moreover, in an integral manner, we can draw on insights offered by traditions of
philosophical ethics on how we ought to live, as applied to environmental issues.
Three ethical traditions– consequentialist, deontological and virtue-based ethics – are
identified in Part 1 of this reader (see the readings from Holbrook, Elliot and Connelly
respectively). In turn, these traditions suggest three moral imperatives – doing good,
doing the right thing and being virtuous. However, one message arising from the Part
1 readings is that a focus on any one dimension of moral concern – the good outcome,
the right course of action or the virtuous activity - can be pursued separately or in
combination. For some these are separate pathways to environmental responsibility
but for others they may be compatible. A similar message comes from other parts of
the reader. Reducing what is in focus to just one dimension risks losing sight of the
bigger picture that is needed in order for us to contextualise our environmental actions
and judge whether we are acting responsibly. The framework for responsibility
suggested in Figure 1 is one way of trying to ensure that questions of environmental
responsibility are addressed in an integral manner. It can be regarded as a device for
synthesising the questions and moral imperatives of environmental responsibility so
as to bring out their respective interdependencies.
The framework provides one way of locating or situating particular ethically informed
endeavours on issues of environmental concern, and how those endeavours might
relate to each other. If, for example, air quality is deemed an issue of concern (what
matters and doing what’s good), then we might anticipate that concern will follow
around the agents of pollution, such as the individual and collective users and
developers of industry and transport (who matters and doing what’s right).
Furthermore, concern around these issues and agents might be justifiable on the basis
of a general virtue of environmental responsibility (why it matters and doing what’s
virtuous) – for example, it might be argued that they are of concern because we care
for and bear accountability towards human and non-human flourishing. In actually
addressing the issue of poor air quality, a utilitarian in a consequentialist tradition may
focus on calculating the costs and benefits associated with different policy initiatives,
a deontologist may be concerned more with setting a standard of air quality that
applies to all (perhaps regardless of the benefits of some air pollution causing
activities), while a virtue-based approach might focus more on encouraging citizens to
use less polluting fuel or companies to be more responsible for their emissions, or
political actors to deliver the objective of clean air.
Figure 1 Environmental Endeavours: towards a framework for environmental
responsibility
While the three corners of the triangle in Figure 1are founded upon ethical concerns
related to readings in Part 1, each corner might loosely be aligned with the particular
emphases of contributors’ concerns in Parts 2, 3 and 4.
In part 2 the emphasis is on what issues matter: what is good (and what is harmful);
what is of value? Such questions prompt a concern that is reflected in the readings
regarding the direct perspective on nature and the duality between human and non-
human worlds mediated through conceptual framing devices. Is responsibility served
by the viewing of non-human nature as some pristine entity to be left alone or is it
perhaps better served through a more hands-on managerial approach? Several
contributors in this part suggest that what really matters for environmental
responsibility are the implications of our distancing ourselves from nature, with
communication (or ‘conversing’) with nature and about nature being a dominant
theme.
Critical to our engagement with nature is the idea of continually developing value. So
developing aesthetic values associated with the natural world, and capturing the value
of interconnectedness, is important. The readings in Part 2 suggest how values may
change, and new values emerge, through creative forms of framing.There is a need
when framing the natural world to nurture new values that are a synthesis of, and an
improvement upon, contrasting perspectives – between, say, science and arts, or
Environmental question: ‘What’ matters?
Moral imperative: doing what’s good
Consequentialist ethic
Environmental question: ‘Who’ matters?
Moral imperative: doing what’s right
Deontological ethic
Environmental question: ‘Why’ does it matter?












between professional planners and radical activists. Issues such as climate change,
energy, transport, pollution, poverty alleviation, biodiversity, animal rights and
environmental justice are all concerns regarding what matters in environmental
responsibility. They are all dependent on the perspectives taken on what matters and
the context (for example, local, regional, national and/or global levels) in which these
perspectives are taken. The natural or biophysical environment will be a part of this,
but may not be the prime matter of concern for everyone. The important point is that
we continually revise and improve upon our frames of reference.
This concern for perspectives is one shared amongst the contributors to Part 3. The
emphasis here shifts towards perceptions amongst humans and the duality between
individual and collective responsibility. These readings raise the impoverished notion
of dualism; for example, regarding environmental issues as matters of either
individual or collective responsibility. Focusing on human choices regarding
safeguarding the commons (such as air, water and land), contributors express the
importance of developing stakeholdings rather than protecting (individual or
collective) stakes, and challenge the trend towards individualisation. Ideas of
meaningful social action, social learning and communities of practice in this part
highlight the need for developing learning capacity amongst individuals and
collectives in order to sustain environmental responsibility. Whilst a deontological
ethic emphasises formal duties and rights (which can often lead to entrenched, static
questions of whose duties and whose rights are involved), the readings in Part 3 raise
possibilities of using existing formalised expressions of duties and rights in less
formal and more creative ways, and of negotiating and developing new duties and
rights.
The Part 4 readings engage more with the political realm around governance and
legitimate political participation in matters associated with environmental
responsibility. The readings here signal important new debates on how responsibility
relates to environmental justice and ecological citizenship. Institutional forms of
governance and protest vary between countries of the global North and those of the
global South, and can change and develop depending on the wider cultural and
ecological circumstances. However, the importance for meaningful civic engagement
with environmental issues in different policy domains as much as in the context of
activism and protest is a concern raised by many of the contributors. The Part 4
readings reflect a virtue-based approach, questioning the existing institutional
frameworks of justification for why it is that some issues appear privileged more than
others, and some ways of dealing with them are prioritised over others. Issues of
justice arise in considering what and whose assumptions underpin these priorities.
Environmental responsibility is a contested terrain open to competing definitions. The
contributors in Part 4, like those in Parts 2 and 3, emphasise the importance of change
and encouraging the potential for change. In Part 4, though, the focus of change and
creativity is around institutional values and norms that permit or prohibit change; it
seeks to allow ideas and ‘facts’ around environmental issues to be contested, and to
allow contrasting perspectives to be expressed.
The air of doom and gloom often prevalent in discussion on environmental crises time
and again prompts despair, fear and cynicism which can cloud more creative forms of
engagement in being more responsible. As our contributors make clear in their
different ways, environmental responsibility requires appropriate creative space.
Being environmentally responsible in a creative and inventive manner requires space
for socio-ecological flourishing. So developing appropriate creative space might be
seen as a driving force for synthesising the three traditions underpinning
environmental responsibility illustrated in Figure 1.
So what types of space might be associated with each tradition?. First, in Part 2
concern is given to ecological space. Though this is commonly measured in
quantitative terms – for example, a measure of ‘area’ (hectares of land) in ecological
footprint or ‘weight’ (tonnes of carbon dioxide) in carbon footprint - the readings in
Part 2 explore ecological space in more qualitative terms, focusing on the types of
framing it involves. Scientific measurements provide one important type of framing,
but other types of inventive framing might also be important in appreciating, re-
evaluating and negotiating ecological space. Such space requires attention to ensuing
changes in our obligations to the non-human natural world, which may in turn shape
the development of new duties and rights. An important virtue here is environmental
justice. Not justice in the familiar quantitative terms of providing the just distribution
of environmental goods and bads, but rather in more qualitative terms, through
appropriate framing devices that do justice to our ecological world. Such justice
requires an appreciation and some understanding of the complexities of multiple
interdependencies in the natural world, whilst keeping a simplicity of framing in order
to communicate effectively with and about nature. The virtue of environmental justice
in this sense warns against the extreme tendencies of, on the one hand, using over-
simplistic models to understand the world (which often generates wilful ignorance of
scientific information) and, on the other hand, being too despairing over the
complexity of our ecological world. Nurturing purposeful simplicity through, for
example, systems thinking, combined with respect in being both inclusive and
pragmatic, provide good guiding principles for framing our ecological space.
Second, environmental responsibility requires appropriate learning space, particularly
space for interaction and learning amongst individual human agents of responsibility
and between individuals and collectives. As explored particularly in the Part 3
readings, such space is continually being negotiated through individual and collective
action. The ideas of social learning and communities of practice raise the question of
what this space ought to look like if it is to enable questioning, and either the fostering
of new principles and rules or the use of existing principles and rules in a creative
manner for environmental responsibility. Appropriate interaction between our
understandings and practices is required, taking heed of the change in values that may
arise from the consequences of previous actions. New understandings and practices
can arise through this kind of learning. Here, a dominant virtue might be identified as
practical wisdom, a virtue that warns against, on the one hand, self-righteousness, and
on the other hand apathy. Practical wisdom thrives in a space where questions are
continually being asked of the right approach to environmental responsibility, and
innovative experimentation is encouraged to improve responsible practice.
A third type of space is that of political space. This represents the spheres – social
(civil society) and individual (private lives) – in which ethical and political concerns
can be contested. Ideas of ecological citizenship, presented particularly in the Part 4
readings, provide some signposting towards a more virtuous engagement with
political space. Here humility might be seen as a particularly important virtue.
Humility prompts the possibility of other virtues appropriate for different
circumstances in different institutional settings at different times, providing political
space for exploring new values and new principles that might be necessary in
emergent socio-political circumstances. Humility also warns against complacency and
arrogance on one hand and cynicism on the other, which too often prevent meaningful
ecological citizenship. However, there are many other virtues associated with
environmental responsibility, and some are more relevant than others depending on
the circumstances. In campaigning for environmental justice in authoritarian societies,
for example, courage is perhaps seen as an equally important virtue. But virtues of
environmental responsibility do not stand still. Like values and principles, they may
change and develop in the course of our engagement with changing environmental
issues.
Each part of this anthology thus provides a unique space that itself allows concerns of
value, principle and virtue to be expressed, albeit with different emphases. But the
collection is more than just the sum of its parts. Two quotations were used to open the
introduction to this anthology. First, reference was made by Wangari Maathai to our
‘special responsibility to the ecosystem of this planet’ in order to sustain a flourishing
of human and non-human worlds. She implicitly called on a virtue of hope and care in
voicing concerns meaningfully rather than through tokenism or opportunism. Second,
Sir Geoffrey Vickers prompted us to think more carefully about the precise ways in
which we ‘regulate our responsiveness so as to preserve the stability of the manifold
systems on which we depend, and … make a collective world in which we
individually can live’. These two concerns represent responsibility as a developmental
attribute, a continually creative endeavour: first, caring for an environment
comprising the natural world of life and life support, of which humans are an integral
part; and second, ensuring accountability for any harm or wrong done to the
environment. Together they provide the creative space required for continuing a
dialogue; the essence of environmental responsibility.
